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Even the occasional consumer of an oyster on the half shell has probably heard the admonition, “Don’t eat
oysters in a month without an ‘R’ in its name.”1 If one goes to any oyster bar along the any American
coast, one can ﬁnd both those who hold religiously and superstitiously to this warning and those who scoﬀ
at it as an outdated and irrelevant. Indeed, some restaurants will not even serve raw oysters during the
summer months (May, June, July and August are the months without an R in their names for those without
a calendar on hand). Meanwhile, somewhat nervous and uncertain tourists can be seen enjoying a rare
opportunity to partake of a dozen or so in the heat of a July or August afternoon wondering if and when
they will get the “golden oyster.”2 So, what is the truth about oysters? Do the locals possess some ancient
wisdom passed down through the generations? Are those souls brave enough to ‘slurp’ a dozen on a Fourth
of July vacation really cheating death? The real answers in this case most certainly lie not only somewhere
between the two extremes but also beyond this measure of safety.
The more important questions discussed within concern the extent to which seafood safety means something
more than the situation described above. What are the health and safety challenges for the seafood industry
and how can the American seafood supply be protected? What role do the state and federal governments
play? Is consumer knowledge and awareness of risks suﬃcient, and if so, what does the above confusion
imply about the state of that knowledge? What follows is a discussion of the seafood industry, issues of
1http://carolinareporter.sc.edu/archive%204-12-20/oyster.html
2“Golden oyster” is actually a term the author and his friends use to refer to that one oyster among the many they eat
which they are convinced will be the cause of their demise, or will at least induce a severely upset stomach.
1health and safety in seafood consumption, and attempts to regulate the industry to protect the consuming
public all cast in the historical perspective of the development of American seafood and shellﬁsh regulation.
While issues confronting the entire seafood industry are addressed, the primary focus herein is directed at
the shellﬁsh industry with particular attention given to the consumption of raw shellﬁsh such as oysters on
the half shell.
Part I of this article introduces the American seafood and shellﬁsh industry and provides some background
data on the composition of the market as well as consumption patterns in the United States. Consideration
is given not only to the domestic commercial supply, but also to a signiﬁcant import segment of the market
as well as recreational ﬁshing and harvesting.
Part II addresses the various risks to seafood and shellﬁsh consumers. Again, though risks across the entire
industry are addressed, particular attention is given to those risks speciﬁc to the shellﬁsh industry. The risks
discussed range from those inherent to diﬀerent types of seafood to health hazards of purely human origin.
Both the level of threat and the seriousness of these diﬀerent health hazards are presented and analyzed.
Current means of risk identiﬁcation and reduction are examined brieﬂy throughout this section.
Part III begins a more speciﬁc examination of past attempts at health and safety regulation of the shellﬁsh
industry. This portion of the article provides the historical context of current shellﬁsh safety programs while
documenting the development and ultimate demise of previous attempts at industry regulation. The section
begins with the creation of the National Shellﬁsh Sanitation Program (NSSP) in 1925 and continues through
its merger into the International Shellﬁsh Sanitation Conference in 1998. Along the way, several safety
issues are introduced that continue to present serious challenges to present eﬀorts to regulate the seafood
and shellﬁsh industries.
Part IV addresses the existing regulatory regime in the seafood and shellﬁsh industries. While particular
attention is given to the HACCP program instituted by the Food and Drug Administration, other exist-
2ing programs such as that run by the National Marine Fisheries Service under the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration are also addressed. The current status and vitality of the National Shellﬁsh
Sanitation Program, now over 75 years old, is also considered.
In Part V, recent criticisms of the existing regulatory regime are addressed. Inadequacies of the current
system are discussed along with potential overlap and duplication among the various programs in existence.
The primary focus of this portion of the article is directed toward the recent reports issued by the General
Accounting Oﬃce in January and July 2001.
The article concludes in Part VI with a prospective consideration of the safety issues facing the seafood and
shellﬁsh industry. The General Accounting Oﬃce recommendations are considered in light of the historical
basis for the current system. Possible alternative approaches to providing for the safety of seafood and
shellﬁsh consumers are discussed, and ﬁnally, the article ends with a brief consideration of some recurring
themes within health and safety regulation in the seafood and shellﬁsh industries.
Part I
For many, seafood is a delicacy. Especially for those from the heartland where fresh seafood is rare, it may
be a treat enjoyed only on special occasions or vacations to coastal areas.3 For others, those who live in
those coastal areas, seafood is a staple. In truth, this description is becoming more stereotype than truth.
3The author, having grown up in rural Tennessee where seafood rarely means more than fried catﬁsh, enjoyed a somewhat
similar experience. His family still celebrates on Christmas Eve with an annual feast consisting of several pounds of shrimp and
scallops. Vacations were eagerly anticipated as much for the food as for the actual visits to the beach.
3While it may have held true in the past, seafood has become an integral part of the American diet. Fish,
in particular, have become a substantial part of a healthy diet, replacing red meats that are increasingly
understood to be linked to heart disease and other health threats.
Since about 1980, a shift has occurred in the diets of health-conscious consumers who have increased their
seafood consumption. While per capita seafood consumption in the United States remained practically
unchanged between 1910 and 1980 at approximately 10-12 pounds per year, that number jumped dramatically
over the next few years reaching 15 pounds per capita by 1986 and peaking at over 16 pounds in 1987.4
While the rate of growth in the seafood market has leveled oﬀ in the last decade, that average American
currently eats approximately 20 pounds of seafood per year.5 The seafood market itself can be divided into
ﬁnﬁsh and shellﬁsh. While ﬁnﬁsh are consumed in much larger amounts, shellﬁsh consumption is estimated
at between 15% and 20% of all annual seafood consumption.6 These numbers may still pale in comparison
to the per capita 60 pounds of chicken and 80 pounds of beef eaten every year, but the seafood market is
the fastest growing of the three.7
The reasons for this growth in the seafood industry can, in large part, be attributed to the potential health
beneﬁts of a diet high in seafood. Medical research has linked ﬁsh consumption to lower risks of heart disease
and strokes.8 Another explanation for the growth of the market is connected to greater availability thanks
to better delivery and preservation methods. Regardless of the explanation, however, seafood consumption
is on the rise, and as has been noted, the result is that, especially if the seafood consumer is a more health-
conscious consumer, concerns about the safety of the seafood supply are also increasing in importance.9
In order to understand many of the safety concerns within the seafood industry, it is important to understand
42-10
53-8; 25-37 Though the total consumption numbers may have been holding steady for the last decade, when recreational
ﬁshing consumption is taken into account, it appears that the actual consumption numbers hover around 20 pounds per year.
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4the composition of the seafood industry itself. Seafood comes primarily from three sources. The ﬁrst of these
is the imported seafood market. Imported seafood accounts for approximately 60% of all seafood eaten in
the United States.10 While meat and poultry supplies are primarily domestic, the United States seafood
supply has not been equal to the growing demand. The majority of these imports come from a few countries
(Canada, Thailand, China, Ecuador, and Chile), but as many as 160 diﬀerent countries supply seafood to
United States customers.11 Domestic seafood supply can be divided into two categories: commercial and
recreational. The commercial market, that which is primarily regulated by the federal and state governments,
consists of approximately 4000 processors and distributors for over 250,000 ﬁshermen and a ﬂeet of almost
100,000 vessels.12 The recreational seafood supply is far less regulated, and thus, far less is known about it.
However, it is estimated that over 17 million recreational ﬁshermen supply 10% of the seafood eaten in the
United States.13
As noted above, consumption patterns for shellﬁsh make up a signiﬁcant minority of the overall seafood
market. Shellﬁsh come from all three sources (imports, domestic commercial and domestic recreational),
but unlike the ﬁnﬁsh market, the majority of shellﬁsh are produced by the domestic commercial industry.14
Though any country can export shellﬁsh to the United States, special permits are required before countries
can supply the American market for uncooked shellﬁsh. Only four countries, Canada, Chile, Korea, and
New Zealand, have agreements with the Food and Drug Administration that permit them to export fresh
and uncooked shellﬁsh to the United States.15
Though the United States market for seafood has grown overall, signiﬁcant harm has been done to the
shellﬁsh industry by several high-proﬁle incidents involving shellﬁsh contamination. The most signiﬁcant
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5of these centers on Gulf oysters. Louisiana is the top producer of oysters for the country, delivering about
60% of the national oyster harvest, or approximately 170 million oysters annually.16 Increased concerns
about safety since the late 1980’s has led to a dramatic drop in demand that threatens the entire Gulf oyster
industry. During the period of 1991 to 1996, oyster prices plummeted by 35-40%.17 Though federal and state
governments along with the shellﬁsh industry have attempted to respond to safety concerns with improved
safety measures and more eﬀective education of consumers, the industry has not been able to recover. As one
ﬁsheries economist stated, “the industry has lost a segment of the population and it will not come back.”18
However, despite the damage done to the Gulf Oyster market, consumers appear to be eating more shellﬁsh
each year. A large part of the Gulf Oyster market has been replaced with substitute oysters from other
regions such as Washington.19 Overall, shellﬁsh are and will continue to be a major part of the American
diet.
One ﬁnal fact about shellﬁsh consumption that is essential to any discussion of seafood safety is the fact
that shellﬁsh are distinct from most other types of meat in one very important way. Shellﬁsh are very
often eaten raw. This aspect of shellﬁsh consumption is a primary contributor to approximately 85% of all
seafood-related illnesses.20 Of course, as any true oyster lover can conﬁrm, cooking them ruins both the
experience and the taste.
Part II
Seafood Safety
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6The term “seafood safety” encompasses a broad range of issues. There is no one health and safety threat
from seafood. Rather, there exists a range of threats, some known and some relatively unknown. Any ex-
amination of the health risks posed by seafood is thus incomplete. It is, however, possible to examine some
of the more prominent threats in both ﬁnﬁsh and shellﬁsh.
The primary areas of risk in the seafood market can be divided into two broad ﬁelds: naturally-occurring
and human-induced. While the lines between these categories blur at points (for instance, where the same
contaminants result from both naturally-occurring and human sources or where human behavior can alter
the seriousness of a naturally-occurring health hazard), they still serve as signiﬁcant dividing lines between
two broad groups of risks. Naturally occurring risks can further be divided into seafood toxins and microbial
threats, both viral and bacterial. Human-induced risks include both (1) viral and bacterial contaminants
that result primarily from sewage dumping and (2) chemical contaminants resulting from industrial or indi-
vidual pollution of the environment.
Documented seafood-related illnesses aﬀect over 110,000 people per year.21 Unreported cases of mild gas-
troenteritis are probably far more common, but statistics on those illnesses not treated or properly identiﬁed
are obviously not available.22 The most common illnesses are of the Norwalk Virus variety, which is blamed
for between 80 and 90% of the overall total. Natural ﬁsh toxins such as Ciguatera and Scromboid Poisoning
make up another 10% of the total seafood-related illnesses annually while a host of other causes are the
source of the remainder.
While seafood health risks are perhaps less publicized than E. Coli and Salmonella outbreaks in red meat and
chicken, they certainly do not pose less risk to the consumer. Indeed, the smaller number of seafood-related
2116-18
22Gastroenteritis is a generic term meaning inﬂammation of the stomach lining which is applied to the gut-wrenching group
of illnesses of many diﬀerent sources often referred to simply as “food poisoning” or mistakenly as the non-existent “24-hour
bug.” Symptoms generally include nausea, diarrhea, and abdominal pain. CancerWeb Online Medical Dictionary, available
online at
http://cancerweb.ncl.ac.uk/cgi-bin/omd?query=gastroenteritis&action=Search+OMD.
7illnesses has more to do with diﬀerences in levels of consumption than it does with actual risk. As noted
above, American consumers eat about three times more chicken than they do seafood. In comparison to all
seafood, chicken does actually cause more illnesses per pound consumed.23 This is because the vast majority
of seafood consumed is of the safer ﬁnﬁsh variety. However, when chicken is compared to shellﬁsh on a pound
for pound basis, shellﬁsh pose overwhelmingly greater health risks. In fact, the numbers are shocking. Raw
shellﬁsh cause illnesses at a rate more than 100 times greater than that of chicken.24 While chicken causes
illnesses in about one out of every 25,000 servings, shellﬁsh illnesses occur in one of each 250 servings. In
fact, to put this another way, if American consumers ate as much raw shellﬁsh each year as they do chicken,
shellﬁsh-related illnesses would number between 300 and 400 million annually!25
Though the majority of these illnesses are often quite minor, the overall costs to the American consumer
are quite substantial. Even at current rates of consumption, seafood-related illnesses exact a heavy cost of
society. In fact, 1995 Food and Drug Administration estimates place the cost of shellﬁsh-related illnesses
alone at over $200 million annually.26
Distinct from these calculated reports of seafood illnesses each year are chemical contaminants. Chemical
contamination risk levels and their eventual costs to society are largely unknown. Signiﬁcantly, while most
microbial and toxic causes of illnesses produce results almost immediately almost immediately upon contact
with the consumer, the length of time and the level of exposure required to cause illness from chemical
contamination may be far greater. The information herein is intended only as an introduction to several of
the more prominent health risks caused by chemical contamination. Anything further would require far more
2325-113 Illnesses caused by chicken occur at a rate 8 to 10 times greater than by all seafood combined.
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8detail than is possible in this overview, and to quote the Committee on Evaluation of the Safety of Fishery
Products, “(t)here is no area...that poses greater challenges to both the scientiﬁc tools for understanding
likely health hazards and the social tools for managing risks, than the diverse collection of chemical residues
that ﬁnd their way into the human diet....”27
Chemical contaminants come primarily in two forms: heavy metals and organic compounds. The most
prominent health hazard among these is mercury. Among organic compounds, PCB’s, pesticides and dioxins
are the most well-known threats. All of these are of signiﬁcant concern in seafood because of bioaccumulation.
Fish and shellﬁsh accumulate and concentrate contaminants at far higher levels than other food products
such as plants and land animals. This phenomenon will be discussed in greater detail below.
Naturally Occurring Health Risks
Among naturally occurring ﬁsh toxins, two account for the majority of illnesses among American consumers:
Scromboid Poisoning and Ciguatera. Scromboid Poisoning is also known as histamine poisoning, and its
symptoms include itching, swelling, and vomiting.28 Scromboid poisoning, resulting from high levels of his-
tamine content in ﬁsh, is most common in Mahimahi and Tuna.29 While the symptoms are relatively mild
and antihistamine medications can control the eﬀects, Scromboid poisoning aﬀects a total of more than 8,000
Americans in almost every state per year.30 Scromboid poisoning can be prevented with proper refrigeration,
because histamine levels increase dramatically in ﬁsh that are not relatively quickly after capture.31
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9Ciguatera is a far smaller risk than Scromboid Poisoning, aﬀecting about 1600 people per year.32 Occurrences
of ciguatoxin poisoning are primarily regional. Over 90% of all cases are found in tropical regions including
Hawaii, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico.33 The toxins result from algae growth in tropical reef
areas, and the primary ﬁsh species implicated in ciguatera are grouper and red snapper.34 While the risk for
consumers is relatively low, the eﬀects of ciguatera can range from those similar to Scromboid Poisoning to
death or severe neurological damage.35 Since testing for ciguatoxin is currently not feasible, the only eﬀective
means of prevention is to prevent ﬁshing in high-risk areas and limit consumption of high-risk ﬁsh.36
Ciguatera and Scromboid Poisoning are the two most common naturally occurring illnesses, but both occur
almost exclusively in ﬁsh. Shellﬁsh present their own host of natural hazards. Some of these are relatively
rare but present quite serious health hazards. Others are far more common but result in only a few life-
threatening illnesses. Not all naturally occurring health threats are understood or possibly even known at
present, and new risks are currently being researched.
Paralytic shellﬁsh poisoning is one of a group of illnesses that are result from the consumption of shellﬁsh
that have been feeding on toxic dinoﬂagellate organisms.37 The illness is relatively rare and appears to aﬄict
only about 20-30 victims per year.38 It is suspected that, as with most food-borne illnesses, mild cases of
paralytic shellﬁsh poisoning are underreported. Poisoning, in its most serious form, can be quite dangerous
and even life threatening. The toxin implicated in paralytic shellﬁsh poisoning is saxitoxin, and it causes
paralysis of the respiratory muscles, which can result in death by asphyxiation.39 Other symptoms include
tingling, burning and numbness as well as drowsiness and incoherence.40 At present, there is no treatment or
3216 again
3326-166
34Book again 89
35Book again 89-90
36Book again 92-93
3726-167
38Book again 96-97
3926-168
40Book again 96-97
10antidote for the poisoning. As indicated above, the toxins that cause paralytic shellﬁsh poisoning are result
when shellﬁsh consume toxic dinoﬂagellates. Those organisms are found primarily in “blooms” that occur
during the summer months, and the only means of prevention is to close contaminated harvest areas.41 As a
result, very few cases result from commercial shellﬁsh harvesting. Most cases of paralytic shellﬁsh poisoning
occur as a result of unauthorized recreational harvesting in closed areas.42
Other shellﬁsh-related illnesses also result from toxic blooms. These are far less common and not fully
understood at present. The most signiﬁcant among these are neurotoxic shellﬁsh poisoning and amnesic
shellﬁsh poisoning. Neurotoxic shellﬁsh poisoning occurs in shellﬁsh that have fed on the organisms that
cause red tides.43 Red tides occur primarily along the Gulf Coast and Florida’s Atlantic Coast, but one of
the most serious outbreaks of neurotoxic shellﬁsh poisoning occurred in North Carolina.44 While the illness
is not typically fatal, the symptoms are quite similar to paralytic shellﬁsh poisoning in that the nervous
system is most seriously impacted.45 Amnesic shellﬁsh poisoning has only been identiﬁed in the last ﬁfteen
years. The ﬁrst known occurrence of the syndrome took place in Canada in late 1988 and aﬀected over 100
people.46 The illness is caused by domoic acid, and leads to disorientation and short-term memory loss as
well as death in elderly victims.47 Amnesic shellﬁsh poisoning has been quite rare in the United States, but
it was recently implicated in the deaths of more than twenty dolphins oﬀ the coast of California.48
By far, the most common naturally occurring health hazards in shellﬁsh are the Vibrio family of bacte-
ria. While the occurrence of Vibrio-related illness is relatively low, Vibrio bacteria are actually incredibly
common—primarily in oysters but also in clams and crab. In fact, one of the most dangerous Vibrio types,
41Book again 98
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48Andrew Bridges, Naturally Occurring Toxin Suspected in Deaths of 22 Dolphins in Southern California 3-23-2002 wire.ap.org
11Vibrio vulniﬁcus, is present in all oysters in the Gulf of Mexico during the months of May to October.49
Though Vulniﬁcus is a particularly potent bacterium that is common to all coastal waters, only about twenty
people per year are sickened by it.50 The bacterium does not seem to have a detrimental eﬀect on most
healthy consumers. It is, however, extremely dangerous to those with already-weakened livers. Persons with
hepatitis, cirrhosis, and similar illnesses are highly susceptible to infections caused by Vulniﬁcus. The infec-
tion, septicemia, has a mortality rate of over 50% making Vulniﬁcus illnesses rare yet extremely dangerous.51
Vulniﬁcus was ﬁrst documented in 1979, but its dangerous reputation has probably been in existence as long
as people have eaten raw oysters. In fact, it is likely that Vulniﬁcus is the primary source of the adage that
one should not eat oysters in a month without the letter R in its name. Vulniﬁcus levels are highest, and
thus most dangerous, in oysters taken from warm waters. As a result, almost all cases of Vulniﬁcus-caused
illness can be traced to raw oysters harvested in Louisiana, Texas, and Florida during the warmer summer
months.52 The bacterium is also one of the most costly in terms of ﬁnancial harm. The FDA estimates that
Vulniﬁcus-related illnesses cost over $120 million annually, or about 60% of the total cost of shellﬁsh-related
illnesses each year.53 It cannot be identiﬁed by sight, smell, or taste, so a range of alternative solutions has
been proposed to prevent Vulniﬁcus illnesses. The most eﬀective means of preventing illness would be to
cook all oysters, as the bacterium does not survive thorough preparation.54 Since the raw oyster consuming
public is unlikely to adopt this approach, other possible methods of prevention center on refrigeration after
harvest and restrictions on harvest in warm water. Both methods are extremely costly and thus, extremely
unpopular within the oyster industry.55
Other forms of Vibrio that pose a risk of illness in consumers include Vibrio cholerae and Vibrio para-
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12haemolyticus. Both are more prevalent than Vulniﬁcus, but neither proves as harmful to consumers. The
illnesses caused by these two strains of Vibrio bacteria are normally limited to diarrhea and nausea, though
especially susceptible consumers (again, those with pre-existing liver illnesses) can be aﬀected far more se-
riously.56 These strains of Vibrio are also destroyed by thorough cooking and aﬄict primarily consumers of
raw oysters.
Human-Induced Health Risks
Illnesses associated with human activity are far more common than those caused by naturally occurring
risks. Shellﬁsh are ﬁlter feeders, meaning they gather their food by ﬁltering the water in which they live. As
a result, they retain many of the contaminants that pollute their habitat at much higher rates than other
types of marine life. The types of human pollution can be most easily separated into two categories. The
ﬁrst type of human pollution is fecal waste contamination, which leads to several viral health threats. The
second includes various types of chemical contamination, chief among these being mercury, the complete
risks of which are far less understood.
Human fecal waste can contain any of more than 100 diﬀerent viruses.57 Viruses from this rather unsavory
source make their way into shellﬁsh through direct dumping from land-based sources, runoﬀ from points
inland, and direct dumping by marine vessels. These viruses range from the relatively harmless, such as the
Norwalk Virus to the exceptionally dangerous and even life-threatening Hepatitis A virus.58 As with many
other raw shellﬁsh-associated illnesses, if consumers fully cooked the shellﬁsh before eating them, the viral
contaminants and ensuing illnesses could almost always be eliminated.
56Book 37-40
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13Hepatitis A caused by seafood consumption makes up a relatively small portion of the total number of
Hepatitis A cases annually, yet it poses a signiﬁcant threat when shellﬁsh growing waters are contaminated.
In total, Hepatitis A cases connected to seafood and shellﬁsh total approximately 1,000 per year.59 Most of
these are actually unconnected to the sanitation of shellﬁsh growing waters, however, and are actually due
to poor food handling or contamination in food preparation. In fact, the most recent conﬁrmed outbreak of
Hepatitis A directly linked to shellﬁsh (raw oysters) took place in 1988 and infected 61 people throughout
the southeast.60
Norwalk viruses are far less dangerous than Hepatitis A, but they are also far more common. In fact, aside
from the common cold, the Norwalk Virus is the largest source of illnesses in the United States.61 In the
context of seafood-related illnesses, the Norwalk virus (actually a family of many viruses) causes over 100,000
illnesses per year.62 The illnesses are typically associated with nausea, diarrhea, and abdominal pain and
pass within one to two days.63 Norwalk Viruses are a major problem in raw shellﬁsh and are often caused
by contamination of shellﬁsh growing waters. In fact, many cases can be connected to shellﬁsh harvesters
themselves. An outbreak in 1997 was directly linked to an oysterman in Louisiana who dumped his sewage
into the waters in which he was working and thus caused at least 432 people to contract the illness.64 Many of
these illnesses are preventable through elimination of just such events as well as eﬀective policing of identiﬁed
contaminated areas.
Chemical contamination often cannot be connected to speciﬁc outbreaks of illnesses in the way viral and
natural illnesses can.65 In fact, for many chemical contaminants any assertion beyond that they are present
in seafood is not easily made. The fact that they are present (and there is ample evidence in that regard)
5916-18
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61FDA Bad Bug Book, available online at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/∼mow/chap34.html
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6416-18 The oysterman himself was suﬀering from the virus at the time.
65The Japanese “Minimata Disease” incident, which is discussed below at p.XXXXX, is exceptional in that regard.
14and that they are present in seafood in far greater quantities than in other food sources, is beyond question
and is a matter of substantial concern. The overall risks of chemical contamination are largely unknown, and
certainly, they are often dependent on the long-term consumption of contaminated foods. Seafood consumers,
however, are far more likely than others to be exposed to potentially harmful chemical contaminants. Fish
are contaminated at a higher rate than any other type of food. FDA analysis has determined that over
5% of all ﬁsh contain illegal residues and toxins.66 The average for all food types is a much lower 2.9
percent.67 The various chemical contaminants found in seafood include heavy metals such as mercury and
organic compounds such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB’s), dioxins and a long list of pesticides. These
contaminants are a problem in both shellﬁsh and ﬁnﬁsh.
While mercury contamination in seafood has probably received the most attention (and does below in this
article, as well), other contaminants may be more common and even more threatening. Disturbingly, a 1987
FDA sampling of domestic seafood identiﬁed pesticide residues in 73% of all samples.68 The health threats
of many of these pesticides are unknown. Some pesticides such as DDT are well-known and considered
dangerous to consumers.69 Others, such as toxaphene are common in the United States yet their health
risks are suspected but unconﬁrmed.70 Most pesticides make their way into water from agricultural runoﬀ
or direct spraying of coastal lands. They are then concentrated in aquatic life and work their way up the
food chain into seafood that is later consumed.71
PCB’s are a signiﬁcant health threat in seafood. Though they have been banned in the United States since
1977, they still show up in signiﬁcant concentrations in both fresh and saltwater seafood.72 The health risks
of PCB’s in seafood have also been documented in greater detail than is the case with pesticides. Quincy
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15Bay in Massachusetts was at one time the source of great controversy in the national discussion of PCB’s.
In 1988, it even became part of the national presidential debate.73 The level of PCB’s found in lobsters
taken from Quincy Bay was so dramatically high, up to thirty times the federal limit of 2 parts per million,
that the EPA even recommended that they should not be eaten at all.74 To compare PCB risks to those
of other food-related health threats, one who consumed Quincy Bay ﬂounder was ten times more likely to
develop cancer than those who drank milk, ate peanut butter, or drank diet soda with saccharin.75 PCB
contaminated waters have often been declared oﬀ-limits to ﬁshermen, but the problems of contaminated
seafood reach American consumers persists. As recently as 1999, it was discovered that ﬁshermen had been
catching ﬁsh from the Hudson River in the George Washington Bridge area and selling them to prominent
restaurants in the New York region.76
Heavy metal, speciﬁcally mercury, levels in ﬁsh and shellﬁsh are probably the single hottest topic in seafood
safety. Other metals, such as lead and cadmium, are also prevalent in seafood. Cadmium, in particular is a
signiﬁcant risk in shellﬁsh as they concentrate the metal at high levels when it exists in their environment.77
Still, mercury has received the most attention and has generated the highest levels of concern over the
years. All of these metals are toxic to humans and pose substantial risks to pregnant and nursing mothers
in particular.
Mercury is most common in seafood in the form known as methyl mercury.78 Although mercury exists
naturally in the environment, this form, which is toxic to humans, is also created through industrial pollution
7324-87
7424-87 A debate ensued with the FDA releasing its own studies that found the actual health threat to be far less severe since
most consumers do not eat enough of the seafood to be aﬀected.
7525-58 The other activities mentioned in comparison involve food consumption that poses cancer risks to consumers. Peanut
butter and milk both contain aﬂatoxin and cause cancer at 1 in 25,000 and 1 in 100,000 rates respectively (for consumption
patterns of four tablespoons and one pint daily respectively). Diet soda with saccharin also causes cancer at about a 1 in
100,000 rate at a one soda per day consumption level. Peter Hutt Article from 1978.
7617-B3 Fishing in that area has been banned for over 25 years, and the ﬁshermen and wholesalers involved were later caught
and prosecuted, but the practice certainly continues in many areas in New York and around the Great Lakes where PCB levels
are also extremely high.
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16that makes its way into the water and is then incorporated into aquatic organisms and later concentrated in
some types of ﬁsh and shellﬁsh.79 Two types of seafood are the most likely to concentrate large amounts of
methyl mercury in their meat. These are large predator ﬁsh and shellﬁsh. The ﬁrst concentrate mercury in
their systems at higher levels due to the fact they live longer and eat other ﬁsh and organisms that already
concentrate the metal while the second serve as ﬁlters in contaminated waters and absorb large amounts
of the metal from their environments.80 The FDA limit for mercury in ﬁsh is 1 part per million. Tileﬁsh,
swordﬁsh, shark and king mackerel can possess mercury levels as high as 4.54 parts per million.81 Of most
concern are swordﬁsh and shark, which are among the most popular food ﬁsh nationally.82
Methyl mercury poisoning can cause severe neurological disorders and death in its victims.83 The most
serious health threat posed by methyl mercury is to pregnant and nursing mothers and their unborn or
infant children whose neurological development can be damaged severely by even lower levels of mercury
exposure. In fact, the FDA has advised pregnant and nursing mothers to avoid the above four types of ﬁsh
entirely while it has advised others to limit consumption to approximately twelve ounces per week.84 Studies
from other countries have shown that even lower levels of mercury exposure can reduce intelligence test scores
by seven or eight points.85 Such results have prompted other groups to suggest the FDA should go farther
in its eﬀorts and issue warnings about many other types of seafood as well. In a report entitled “Brain Food:
What Women Should Know About Mercury Contamination in Fish,” the Environmental Working Group
and U.S. Public Interest Research Group criticized the FDA warnings as insuﬃcient to protect pregnant
women and even women of childbearing age.86 The other types of seafood that they contend are also serious
79FDA Advisory, March 2001, again
80FDA Consumer Advisory, May 1995, available online at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼acrobat/hgadv7.pdf
81FDA Consumer Advisory, May 2001, available online at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼acrobat/hgadv2.pdf
82FDA Advisory, May 2001, again
83FDA Advisory, May 1995, again
84FDA Advisory, May 2001, again
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17health risks include canned tuna and oysters taken from the Gulf Coast.87 At present, however, pregnant
women face unknowns that lead many to simply abstain from all ﬁsh.88
In sum, the dangers posed by seafood consumption are varied and range from serious to seriously annoying.
In the section above, this article has presented only an overview of the diﬀerent groups of threats facing
consumers. Subsequent sections present a more detailed analysis of attempts, and the lack thereof, by federal
and state regulatory bodies to address these health risks and inform and protect the American consumer.
Part IIIHistorical Underpinnings of Shellﬁsh Regulation
The National Shellﬁsh Sanitation Program Under the Public Health Service
Shellﬁsh have always been a staple of the North American diet. Therefore, placing a date on the ﬁrst eﬀorts
to regulate seafood and shellﬁsh harvesting and consumption would be impossible. At least as early as 1658,
the Dutch Council of New Amsterdam had passed regulations governing the harvesting of oysters from the
East River.89 At least three of the thirteen English colonies had laws regulating shellﬁsh collection in order
to prevent overcollecting and guarantee sustained supply.90 Health and safety issues surrounding shellﬁsh
876-1 Oysters, especially those from the Gulf of Mexico, have long been considered a mercury-related health risk with the
National Shellﬁsh Sanitation Program studying the issue since the Minimata Disaster in the 1950’s. See infra p. XXXXX.
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18consumption are more recent yet still date back to the beginning of the last century.
Near the end of the nineteenth century, shellﬁsh sanitation became a national issue. Several places in the
United States as well as European countries had experienced outbreaks of illnesses tied to the consumption
of shellﬁsh, primarily raw shellﬁsh.91 The most serious of these occurred in 1924 in New York, Chicago,
and Washington, D.C. A typhoid fever outbreak in those three cities was connected to oysters that had
been collected from sewage-polluted waters.92 This series of incidents sparked a national outcry that led the
individual states, which had traditionally had responsibility for this food safety issue, to request the Surgeon
General of the Public Health Service to develop a national system of ensuring the safety of the shellﬁsh
supply.93 The Surgeon General’s response to calls for control measures to protect the consuming public set
the stage for over ﬁve decades of seafood and shellﬁsh regulation. In fact, it might be more accurate to say
the groundwork put in place in 1925 still shapes such regulation to this day.
On February 19, 1925, the Surgeon General convened a conference in Washington, D.C., that included state
and city health authorities, the Public Heath Service and its Bureau of Chemistry (which would later become
the Food and Drug Administration), the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries (the predecessor of the National
Marine Fisheries Service) and representatives of the shellﬁsh industry.94 This conference, the ﬁrst of its kind,
endeavored to develop a system of sanitary controls for the harvesting, shipping, and production of shellﬁsh
in the United States. The result was a series of resolutions for regulation and governance of the shellﬁsh
industry that rested primarily on cooperation between the federal and state governments and voluntary
compliance by states and members of the industry. The conference stopped short, however, of elaborating
the speciﬁc means by which the various participants would achieve the goals expressed in those resolutions.
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19The resolutions included the following ﬁve principles governing all aspects of the shellﬁsh industry, from
harvest to delivery to the consumer:
1.
The beds on which shellﬁsh are grown must be determined, inspected, and controlled
by some oﬃcial state agency and the U.S. Public Health Service.
2.
The plants in which shellﬁsh are shucked or otherwise prepared or packed by the
shipper must be inspected and controlled by some oﬃcial state agency and the U.S. Public
Health Service.
3.
There must be such governmental supervision and such trade organization as will
make plain the source of shellﬁsh and will prevent shellﬁsh from one source being substituted
for those from another source. This will be chieﬂy a problem of the individual state.
4.
The methods of shipping must be supervised, inspected, controlled and approved
by the proper oﬃcial federal and state agency.
5.
The product must conform to an established bacterial standard and must meet
federal, state, and local laws and regulations relative to salinity, water content, food proportion
and conform to the Pure Food Laws standards.95
In place of more speciﬁc guidelines, the conference established a committee to develop any further guidelines
that might prove necessary in ensuring the safety of the shellﬁsh supply.96
After this conference, the Surgeon General set out the principles on which a national shellﬁsh program would
96History 372
20be founded. As can be seen in the Surgeon General’s letter of August 12, 1925, expressing these principles,
the majority of the responsibility for shellﬁsh regulation and monitoring was left to the states who relied on
voluntary industry cooperation while the Public Health Service was focused more on providing information
to the states and facilitating cooperation among them rather than directly regulating the shellﬁsh industry.97
The guiding principles of the time that provided a limited deﬁnition of interstate commerce and broad state
autonomy in regulating means of production prior to the New Deal Era are evidenced in the shape the
“national” program assumed.
As a means of implementing the goals set forth at the conference, the participants agreed that each state
would issue certiﬁcates that would serve as operating permits to all shellﬁsh shippers that met sanitary
standards.98 The Public Health Service would disseminate information on each state’s program in what
was titled the “Progress Report on Shellﬁsh Sanitation.”99 This system was soon discarded and the Public
Health Service moved to a system of program endorsement whereby it evaluated the eﬀectiveness of each
state’s program. In order to do this, the Public Health Service developed the “Manual of Recommended
Practice for Sanitary Control of the Shellﬁsh Industry” and published a list of all certiﬁed shellﬁsh shippers
in each state.100 Thus, the National Shellﬁsh Sanitation Program was born.
97History 373 The Surgeon General’s letter set forth the following understandings based on the conference:
1. The Public Health Service considers that the responsibility for the sanitary control of the shellﬁsh industry rests chieﬂy
upon the individual states; and that the requisite coordination and uniformity of control may best be achieved by mutual
agreement among the states, with the assistance and cooperation of the Public Health Service....
2. In accordance with this principle, it is considered that each producing state is directly responsible or the eﬀective regulation
of all production and handling of shellﬁsh within its conﬁnes, not merely for the protection of its own citizens, but equally for
safeguarding such of its product as goes to other states....
3. In order that each state may have full information concerning the measures carried out in other states, the Public Health
Service will undertake systematic surveys of the machinery and eﬃciency of sanitary control as actually established in each
producing state, and will report thereon for the information of the authorities of other states. It is believed that, in addition to
furnishing valuable information, these reports will have an important inﬂuence in stimulating the development of better sanitary
control and in promoting substantial uniformity on a higher plane. The oﬃcers of the Public Health Service assigned to this
survey work will assist the state agencies in determining their sanitary problems, in formulating plans for adequate sanitary
control, and in making actual sanitary surveys as far as practicable.
4. In addition to the above, the Public Health Service will continue to extend the services which it is already rendering,
especially in conducting scientiﬁc investigations of fundamental importance to control, and in serving as a clearinghouse for the
interchange of information and the discussion of policies between state authorities.
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21The National Shellﬁsh Sanitation Program (NSSP), as described above, was founded on state regulation with
national technical assistance and relied upon voluntary industry participation. Little has changed over the
years. The NSSP still depends upon the voluntary cooperation of all participating members. There have,
however, been signiﬁcant changes to the NSSP, its scope, and its composition since 1925.
The ﬁrst major changes occurred in the 1940’s. As already mentioned, the original vision of the NSSP was
very much restricted by the prevailing deﬁnition of interstate commerce and the proper role of the federal
government in regulating economic activity. Though the NSSP has continued to leave the majority of the
responsibility for ensuring safety to states, the evolving understanding of the role played by the federal
government certainly appeared in revisions of the NSSP. During the 1940’s, in the face of worries about
paralytic shellﬁsh poisoning, the NSSP added requirements to address this issue of national concern.101 This
was the ﬁrst expansion of the NSSP beyond simply compiling information to facilitate state programs and
interstate shipping of shellﬁsh.
During the 1950’s, the NSSP entered a new era of heightened activity. Participants realized greater dialogue
was needed concerning new and recurring issues the program was confronting. In response, the ﬁrst National
Conference on Shellﬁsh Sanitation took place in 1954.102 Though the 1925 Report of Committee on Sanitary
Control of the Shellﬁsh Industry in the United States had been revised twice in the ensuing three decades
(in 1937 and 1946), participants acknowledged that a more substantial revision had become necessary.103
As the Second and Third National Workshops convened in 1956 and 1958, the NSSP was also developing a
two-part manual describing the program in greater detail.104 These manuals, Part I entitled “Sanitation of
Shellﬁsh Growing Areas” and Part II entitled “Sanitation of Harvesting and Processing of Shellﬁsh,” were
published between 1957 and 1959.105
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22During the same period, new health risks associated with shellﬁsh were presenting themselves. In 1957, evi-
dence demonstrated that shellﬁsh concentrated radioactive materials found in their environment, and health
guidelines were added for these contaminants.106 Research also took place throughout the 1950’s concerning
the eﬀect of industrial pollution on shellﬁsh. Much of this research was prompted by the occurrence of what
came to be known as “Minimata Disease” in Minimata Bay, Japan.107 Starting in 1953, a severe neurological
disorder was identiﬁed in the villagers who lived in the vicinity of the Bay and ate large quantities of seafood
taken directly from it. This illness attacked the nervous system and caused severe permanent disabilities
and degeneration of the tissues of the brain as well as death in many cases.108 By 1960, the disease had been
linked to the Chisso Corporation that was producing vinyl chloride and dumping mercury into the bay.109
Minimata Disease was, in fact, methyl mercury poisoning, and over 3000 people in a village of approximately
10,000 developed the illness.110 This disaster captured the attention of the American public health commu-
nity. The Fourth Shellﬁsh Sanitation Workshop addressed the similarities of areas along the Gulf of Mexico
with Minimata and studies were conducted into potential health hazards facing the American consuming
public.111
At the same Workshop in 1961, results of studies were presented that indicated exceptionally high level of
metals such as copper and zinc in shellﬁsh taken from the Chesapeake Bay.112 In particular, oysters demon-
strated extremely high concentrations of these metals. These results raised serious concerns not only about
the safety of oysters containing these metals (as well as other known health hazards such as paralytic shellﬁsh
poisoning which had been worrisome since the 1940’s), but also raised the question, “What else do shellﬁsh
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23accumulate?”113 The Workshop participants were unable to answer this question, but it clearly indicated
the need for a better understanding of the levels of human contaminants concentrated in the shellﬁsh supply
and the risks those posed to consumers.
By the time of the Fifth Workshop in 1964, concerns about shellﬁsh safety had increased signiﬁcantly. The
Public Health Service was taking a much more aggressive stance in pursuing the goals of the NSSP and
protecting the American consumer. Much of this new intensity is evidenced in statement of Eugene Jensen,
the head of the Shellﬁsh Sanitation Branch of the PHS. Jensen, in his comments at the Workshop, made
several recommendations for the continuation of a viable American shellﬁsh industry. He concluded that
the coastal development of the post-World War II period had brought the shellﬁsh industry a host of new
challenges that were making it “exceedingly diﬃcult to maintain a satisfactory conﬁdence factor in the (shell-
ﬁsh supply).”114 It was the position of the PHS to remain faithful to the principle that shellﬁsh must be
as safe as other foods. In order to accomplish that, Jensen suggested the shellﬁsh industry and the state
and federal governments faced a major crossroads at which they had to choose whether to allow continued
consumption of raw shellﬁsh.115 As alternatives to the existing system and eﬀorts to reduce the risk of
raw shellﬁsh consumption, Jensen proposed discouraging consumption of raw shellﬁsh, banning raw shellﬁsh
from interstate commerce, and warning consumers of the unavoidable health risks posed by raw shellﬁsh.116
Though Jensen acknowledged that few changes of the nature he proposed were likely, he warned participants
that a system accepting the status quo and expecting the NSSP to provide for the safety of the shellﬁsh
supply was “rapidly becoming obsolete.”117
One method of shellﬁsh sanitation that was discussed in great detail at the 1964 Workshop and was endorsed
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24by Jensen was depuration. Depuration is a post-harvest treatment process “in which shellﬁsh are held in a
clean water environment for a time suﬃcient to permit them to free themselves of (many viral and bacterial
contaminants) through normal biological processes.”118 Depuration was not considered a viable solution
to chemical contamination of shellﬁsh waters but rather was focused primarily on combating human waste
contamination and natural health risks.119 Though the depuration process had been in existence since the
previous century and used extensively in Europe, very little had been done to bring the process to the United
States.120 Five states reported on research they were conducting into depuration and its promise in the area
of shellﬁsh decontamination. The results were mixed, and given industry sentiment that depuration would
add signiﬁcantly to the costs of the shellﬁsh processing without guaranteeing signiﬁcantly improved safety,
no further action took place.121
The National Shellﬁsh Sanitation Program Under the FDA
The 1960’s proved an eventful period for the NSSP. Not only did the Program hold three Workshops (1961,
1964 and 1968) and revise the Manual of Operations in 1965, but federal responsibility for the program was
also transferred from the Public Health Service to the Food and Drug Administration in 1968.122 In shifting
responsibility for shellﬁsh safety, the Secretary of Health and Human Services made the FDA the principal
federal agency responsible for shellﬁsh regulation.123 The 1960’s had also been a period of increased concern
for those involved in the NSSP and working to improve shellﬁsh safety. There existed a growing sense that
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25the NSSP did not and could not meet its goals of providing a safe shellﬁsh supply to consumers. In particu-
lar, the federal government was not seen as providing an adequate coordinating structure within which the
states and the shellﬁsh industry would protect the shellﬁsh supply.
The primary problem identiﬁed with the NSSP was that the Public Health Service, and later the FDA,
had only one power in the NSSP—the power to decertify a state’s shellﬁsh sanitation program.124 In fact,
during the 1950’s this issue had arisen, and the program endorsement system had been criticized because
the process by which the PHS made the “program endorsement” decision appeared arbitrary and highly
subjective.125 As the NSSP entered the 1960’s it set about the process of developing objective criteria for
program endorsement. That project resulted in the 1965 revision of the Manual of Operations mentioned
above.126 This manual on the “Appraisal of State Shellﬁsh Sanitation Programs” laid out several procedures
that states could choose to undertake if they wished to be endorsed by the PHS.127 Yet, states faced very
few, if any, consequences, short of the drastic step of removal of PHS endorsement, if they neglected their
role in ensuring shellﬁsh safety. This voluntary system was in place when the FDA was given control of the
federal role in the NSSP in 1968.
As the FDA assumed this responsibility, it also examined ways in which the NSSP could be modernized
and made more eﬀective. The need for this eﬀort was made clear by the FDA who stated, “(i)t has be-
come evident...that harvesting, processing, packaging, and storage practices in the shellﬁsh industry are
in many instances not adequate to assure that consumers receive only safe and wholesome products.”128
By 1971, the FDA had begun considering changes to the NSSP, including issuing formal regulations for
the program. The need or just such a formal authorization of power was supported by such instances as
a 1972 memorandum from the Department of Health and Human Services calling into question the legal
124Fed Reg 25919
125Fed Reg 25917
126Fed Reg 25918
127Fed Reg 25918
128Fed Reg 25918
26status of the NSSP.129 This memorandum called into question the power of the FDA to take any action
whatsoever under the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act for noncompliance with the voluntary NSSP.130 The
GAO further called into question the eﬀectiveness of the NSSP in 1973 when it issued its report “Protecting
the Consumer from Potentially Harmful Shellﬁsh” which found the Program woefully inadequate to protect
American consumers.131 The GAO found that:
1.
Shellﬁsh not meeting NSSP standards were reaching the consumer in
quantities suﬃcient to called the eﬀectiveness of the NSSP into question;
2. The FDA was not adequately monitoring the states to ensure shellﬁsh safety;
3. The States were also not fulﬁlling their responsibility to guarantee the safety and sanitation of shellﬁsh
growing waters or processing conditions.132
Among the GAO ﬁndings were conclusions that 31% of shellﬁsh sampled did not meet NSSP standards for
safety and 40% of shellﬁsh processors operated in unsanitary conditions.133 The Report was also critical of
the absence of any standards with regard to toxic metals other than mercury and the failure of the FDA and
states to follow-up on contaminated shellﬁsh and identify the source waters from which they were taken.134
As the FDA considered what approach to take with regard to improving shellﬁsh safety, one decision made
early on was to preserve the framework established ﬁve decades earlier by the NSSP. Rather than begin with
a clean slate, the FDA opted for designing a program based on the pre-existing NSSP and work to shore up
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which could have led to decertiﬁcation.
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27its inadequacies. The primary among these was determined to be the absence of any regulatory framework
upon which the NSSP rested. Thus, on June 19, 1975, as the National Shellﬁsh Sanitation Program turned
ﬁfty years old, the FDA issued a notice of proposed rule making to create the National Shellﬁsh Safety
Program.135
The proposed regulations for the National Shellﬁsh Safety Program had been several years in the making
and began with the following introduction of purpose:
The Commissioner of Food and Drugs is proposing regulations to ensure the safety and wholesome-
ness of fresh and frozen molluscan shellﬁsh (oysters, clams and mussels) sold in interstate commerce.
The proposal is designed to maintain and strengthen the voluntary 50-year-old National Shellﬁsh
Sanitation Program under which the Federal Government, the States and the industry cooperate to
ensure safe and wholesome shellﬁsh. The proposed regulations would formalize the procedures under
which the existing program has been operating, and make them nationally uniform. They would
deﬁne the scope, requirements and responsibilities of the State and Federal governmental agencies
involved. The proposal is intended to satisfy the needs for procedural and other improvements in
the existing shellﬁsh control program....136
The NSSP, which had been structurally unchanged since 1925, had failed to keep up with changing times
and circumstances. As the FDA stated, improvements in refrigeration and distribution systems had moved
the fresh shellﬁsh industry from a regional industry to a national one that required a heightened level of
uniform quality control.137
The primary issue addressed by the FDA in its proposed regulations was the lack of any real enforcement
power by which it could monitor state and industry activity. It concluded that the only power possessed by
the FDA, decertiﬁcation of a state program for failure to meet Program guidelines was “grossly impractical”
and “neither serves eﬀectively to ensure that only sanitary shellﬁsh reach the consumer nor does it deal
practically with the economic interests of States where the shellﬁsh industry is of great importance.”138 The
conclusion was that the FDA needed a range of enforcement options that were better tailored to eﬀective
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28federal enforcement of safety standards. Those enforcement options needed to have real eﬀect as well. The
decertiﬁcation power held by the FDA did not actually prevent the shipment of unsafe shellﬁsh in interstate
commerce. In fact, the FDA acknowledged that a decertiﬁed state would still be able to ship its shellﬁsh to
any person in any state who was willing to accept it.139 The FDA also could not take action against individual
shippers but had to rely on the states to take action. The FDA had little more than its credibility and a thin
power of persuasion with which it was charged to protect shellﬁsh consumers. The consuming public was
of much greater focus than had been the case ﬁfty years earlier. As the FDA stated, “Since its inception,
the NSSP has played a major role in shellﬁsh sanitation. The NSSP does not, however, bring together all
persons interested in this subject. All members of the public are aﬀected by, and many are interested in,
the manner in which our consumer goods and resources are regulated. It is important, therefore, to adopt a
more formal and public approach to the regulation of the shellﬁsh industry in the United States.”140
The proposed regulations reforming the NSSP were premised upon on FDA authority under the Federal Food,
Drug & Cosmetic Act and left primary enforcement responsibility with the states but allowed the FDA more
ability to coordinate and monitor that enforcement. The FDA provided a substantial justiﬁcation for this
formalization of the program. First, it noted the failure of almost one third of the states participating in the
NSSP to meet existing standards.141 Further, the FDA pointed out the patchwork of standards that existed
across the country. States participating in the NSSP were “simply ignoring” the Manual of Recommended
Practices which caused safety and quality to vary widely from state to state.142 The regulations established
uniform national standards for shellﬁsh growing waters, product labeling, and control practices and sanitary
requirements of shellﬁsh handlers and processors.143 All of this, the FDA proposed to organize under the
renamed National Shellﬁsh Safety Program.
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29The ‘new and improved’ NSSP proposal was not received well by the states and industry representatives.
The FDA received 274 comments regarding its proposal, and these overwhelmingly argued against the
regulations.144 The primary arguments against the regulations rested on economic burden for enhanced
safety measures. The states asserted they had inadequate resources and insuﬃcient support to achieve the
new level of enforcement to which the proposed regulations aspired.145 Industry representatives likewise
complained that the changes proposed would places economic hardships upon them unwarranted by the
increased measure of safety that would be achieved.
The 9th National Shellﬁsh Sanitation Workshop took place on June 25 and 26, 1975, and focused almost
entirely on the proposed regulations. There, FDA representatives attempted to explain the proposed regu-
lations and reiterated the need for what the keynote speaker for the previous year’s workshop, FDA Chief
Counsel Peter Barton Hutt, called a more precise “riﬂe approach” as opposed to the “shotgun” approach
that was its only enforcement weapon.146 The FDA stressed that the proposals were not an attempt by
federal regulators simply to expand their power but were in line with needs identiﬁed by the GAO and the
FDA over the previous ﬁve years.147 The FDA also made it clear that consumer conﬁdence in shellﬁsh safety
was essential and that conﬁdence was slipping and would be reinforced by more open procedures that made
federal-state-industry cooperation oﬃcial and assuredly legal.148 Again however, the Workshop participants
focused primarily on the costs of any proposed changes to the NSSP. The also showed concern at the formal-
ization of the program, showing a clear preference for the informal workings of the NSP as it existed. The
comments of John Ray Nelson of the Gulf Coast Shellﬁsh Industry made this point outright when he said,
“there is very little fundamentally wrong with the proposed regulations as such, but by publishing them in
14450 Fed Reg 7797 (February 26, 1985)
145Fed Reg 1985
1469th Workshop 15
1479th Workshop 15
1489th Workshop 15
30the Federal Register, they will become law rather than guidelines.”149
Ultimately, the proposed regulations remained nothing more than a proposal. The period for comment ended
in 1975 and little was done to pursue a ﬁnal rulemaking. The National Shellﬁsh Sanitation Program was
left unchanged. Remarkably, the 10th National Shellﬁsh Sanitation Workshop took place in June of 1977,
and the tone had changed dramatically. Very little time was spent discussing the proposed FDA regulations.
The Chief of the Shellﬁsh Sanitation Branch at the FDA, J. David Clem, did address the workshop and
discuss the status of the proposed rulemaking.150 He acknowledged the delay and silence from the FDA and
said a revised proposal was planned but provided no further details on the regulations.151 David Dressel of
the National Marine Fisheries Service addressed the workshop and declared that the single greatest problem
facing the shellﬁsh industry at that time was overregulation.152 Little else needed to be said about the
proposed regulations. Any plan to give the FDA oﬃcial authority to oversee shellﬁsh safety had passed away
quietly in that two-year period.
Ten years later, on February 26, 1985, the FDA ﬁnally oﬃcially shut the door on its regulations by withdraw-
ing the proposed rule creating the National Shellﬁsh Safety Program.153 In what was almost an afterthought,
it cited for this decision the fact that economic analysis had shown the proposed rule would have cost the
shellﬁsh industry $24 million annually and the states an additional $6.2 million per year.154 No statement of
the cost savings due to increased safety and a reduction in illnesses was provided for comparison. Another
possible interpretation is that the FDA regulations were washed away by the anti-regulatory wave that had
swept through Washington in the ensuing ten years. The FDA also asserted that it had determined, in
an about face from ten years previous, that federal regulations were unnecessary. It cited as the basis for
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31that surprising switch some recent GAO ﬁndings that the regulations would have left signiﬁcant gaps in the
shellﬁsh safety net and the creation of the Interstate Shellﬁsh Sanitation Conference.
Modern Era of Seafood and Shellﬁsh Regulation 1982-Present
Based on the “dirty laundry” the FDA had aired in the preamble to its proposed regulations, it was evident
that there existed severe problems of shellﬁsh safety and inaction was not a viable option.155 The states
and industry were certainly not sitting still waiting for FDA rulemaking to proceed. Indeed, along with
their direct eﬀorts to prevent rulemaking, they also moved to reshape the NSSP themselves in the hopes of
heading oﬀ any eﬀorts to federalize the program. The result of these eﬀorts was the creation of the Interstate
Shellﬁsh Sanitation Conference (ISSC) in 1982. The ISSC was developed by the states and industry with
FDA cooperation between 1979 and 1982.156 The model used for this voluntary program was the National
Conference of Interstate Milk Shippers, which had been in existence since 1950 and was considered by ISSC
planners a successful example of national coordination to protect the public health.157 The ISSC describes
its mission as follows:
(T)o foster and promote shellﬁsh sanitation through the cooperation of state and federal con-
trol agencies, the shellﬁsh industry, and the academic community. To achieve this purpose the ISSC:
-
Adopts uniform procedures, incorporated into an Interstate Shellﬁsh Sanitation
Program, and implemented by all shellﬁsh control agencies;
- Gives state shellﬁsh programs current and comprehensive sanitation guidelines to regulate the harvest-
1559th Conference 15 Indeed, Workshop participants complained as much about the fact the FDA had revealed the seriousness
of the shellﬁsh safety program’s problems in its proposed rulemaking as they did about the proposed regulations themselves!
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32ing, processing, and shipping of shellﬁsh;
- Provides a forum for shellﬁsh control agencies, the shellﬁsh industry, and academic community to resolve
major issues concerning shellﬁsh sanitation;
- Informs all interested parties of recent developments in shellﬁsh sanitation and other major issues of
concern through the use of news media, publications, regional and national meetings, internet, and by
working closely with academic institutions and trade associations.158
Thus, the ISSC organized a uniform national standard for shellﬁsh safety much in the way the FDA had
proposed yet in clear rejection of the path of federal regulation.159 The ISSC made further steps to coordinate
federal, state, and industry activities when the FDA entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the
ISSC oﬃcially acknowledging the cooperative relationship the two bodies intended to occur.160
The single largest endeavor undertaken by the ISSC was precisely that proposed by the FDA in 1975,
uniformity among the states. As noted above, several states were ignoring the NSSP manual, which the
FDA again revised in 1985, and shellﬁsh supply was less safe as a result. The ISSC, working with the FDA,
began in 1987 attempts to create a Model Ordinance to be enacted by all states participating in the ISSC.161
The draft Model Ordinance was presented and adopted in 1992.162 The largest question looming above
this process was the role to be played by the existing NSSP Manual. Was it to be discarded or would it
co-exist with the new and potentially conﬂicting rules of the ISSC? In the end, the decision was reached
that the NSSP would be incorporated in large part into the Model Ordinance.163 The portion of the NSSP
Manual that did not ﬁt within the limits of the Model Ordinance was the basis of the Interstate Shellﬁsh
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33Sanitation Program, but in order to prevent confusion, the new program reverted to the title of National
Shellﬁsh Sanitation Program.164 Thus, ﬁnally, in 1998, the NSSP was eﬀectively moved under the umbrella
of the ISSC. No further workshops have taken place since the creation of the ISSC in 1982. In their stead,
the ISSC meets annually to address issues of concern with regard to shellﬁsh safety.
To fully understand the process that took place throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s and
Continues today, it is essential to back up a bit to 1984 and examine the environment under which the ISSC
and other current programs came to be what they are now. 1984 marks the date of the FDA Memorandum of
Understanding with the ISSC as well as the release of the GAO report, Problems in Protecting Consumers from Illegally Harvested Shellﬁsh.165
The report had been requested by New York Congressman Thomas J. Downey after 750 New Yorkers were
sickened by what appeared to be a Norwalk virus they contracted from eating raw clams.166 The conclusions
of this report illustrate the change in political environment that had taken place since 1975.
The GAO found severe problems with the NSSP and with FDA. These ﬁndings could not be called surprising
as most if not all of them had existed ten years earlier and had been addressed by the FDA as major moti-
vating factors for its proposed regulations. The GAO’s conclusion with regard to the NSSP was that “(it)
has laudable objective but cannot enforce compliance.”167 The fact that the FDA lacked any enforcement
power left it unable to address violations of the program. The GAO went on to address the serious issues
at the state level that had also been brought to light in 1975. First, the states had insuﬃcient staﬀ and
equipment to control illegal harvesting.168 Though states bore full responsibility for supervision of shellﬁsh
harvesting, the GAO identiﬁed immense disparities between resources available and needed to adequately
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34police illegal activity that resulted in the harvesting of contaminated shellﬁsh.169 Second, the program pro-
vided no successful means of identifying the source and original harvester of shellﬁsh.170 According to the
report, and again as had been put forth in 1975, contaminated shellﬁsh, once identiﬁed, could not be linked
to speciﬁc growing waters or harvesters which meant states had no ability to determine the speciﬁc causes
(contaminated growing areas) for the eﬀects (contaminated shellﬁsh) they were observing.171 Third, the
ﬁnes imposed on illegal harvesters were inadequate to deter such activity.172 The standard ﬁnes for illegal
harvesting were usually about $25, which meant illegal activity promised an almost guaranteed reward far
in excess of any potential penalty.173 Finally, growing areas were not being adequately inspected.174 The
report found that contaminated areas were likely still open for harvesting because waters were not regularly
inspected. This again pointed out the dangers posed by insuﬃcient resources.
After reaching all of these conclusions, most the very same that had been reached by the FDA in 1975, the
GAO came to a very diﬀerent result. The GAO did not recommend federal regulation to create a coordinated
and uniform shellﬁsh safety program. In fact, the GAO said such a program would create an “adversarial
relationship” between the FDA and the states, citing state objections to the 1975 proposals as evidence.175
Instead, the GAO recommended pursuing development of the ISSC as a cooperative program involving the
FDA.176 The report treated the voluntary nature of the program, what had once been a source of criticism,
as one of its primary beneﬁts, saying self-imposed requirements would be more eﬀective than outside regula-
tion.177 The GAO advocated adoption of the program, rejecting central control or federal supervision. This
analysis had substantial force at the time. When the FDA withdrew its proposed regulations a year later, it
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35largely adopted the position of the GAO report.178
Though federal regulation of the shellﬁsh sanitation program died in the mid-1980s, concerns about seafood
and shellﬁsh safety certainly did not. By 1988, Congress was focused on seafood safety and considering means
of addressing what were perceived as severe health risks. Heightened concerns about seafood safety was best
summed up in the 1988 GAO report, Seafood Safety- Seriousness of Problems and Eﬀorts to Protect Consumers,
as a result of the belief seafood posed unacceptable health risks because it was not subjected to mandatory
inspections in the way chicken and beef are.179 The facts that seafood was being consumed in greater quan-
tities than ever before and that seafood posed health risks at least in equal proportion to those posed by
chicken and beef made the absence of mandatory inspection even more controversial.180 Still, Congress did
not act to institute mandatory inspection though debate continued through the rest of the decade and into
the 1990s.
The status of federal and state seafood safety programs as of 1988 could only be described as scattered.
Indeed, federal and state regulation as well as public-private cooperative programs presented a patchwork
of oversight that had been instituted at various points in time and had evolved and been reshaped into
their current forms (among these the NSSP and ISSC). A more complete listing of the various programs
in place at the time included at the federal level: 1) by the FDA: a limited amount of processors plant
inspections and product sampling under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the NSSP, and the Salmon
Program—a voluntary harvesting and processing inspection program; 2) by the National Marine Fisheries
Service: the Voluntary Seafood Inspection Program oﬀering fee-based inspection and grading of ﬁsh and
shellﬁsh and Lacey Act enforcement to prevent illegal harvesting of ﬁsh and shellﬁsh; and 3) a collection
of smaller programs headed by the National Ocean Service, Oﬃce of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research,
Centers for Disease Control, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Toxicology Program, and an extensive list
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36of statutory enforcement programs under the Environmental Protection Agency.181 This list only describes
federal programs.
At the state and local level, many of the programs mentioned above were duplicated or overlapped by similar
inspection programs, and the ISSC ensured that each shellﬁsh producing state at least had responsibility
for overseeing a program of shellﬁsh sanitation. Actual cooperation with ISSC standards by the member
states (23 in total) was found to be an entirely diﬀerent story. The FDA surveyed the program in 1985
and 1986 and found that 80% of the states were in violation of growing area and water classiﬁcation rules,
60-80% were not conforming with patrolling and enforcement requirements, and 70-80% were not meeting
plant sanitation standards.182 Nine states, 40% of the NSSP participants, were considered to be at a level of
substantial nonconformance that was of public health signiﬁcance.183 This number was almost identical to
that published twenty years earlier indicating that shellﬁsh sanitation eﬀorts were failing or at least having
no eﬀect. Despite these results, the GAO concluded that no universal mandatory inspection program was
warranted for either seafood or shellﬁsh.184
Congress was not yet convinced that increased federal involvement was unneeded though it is diﬃcult to say
they were moved to action. Multiple committees in the House of Representatives in particular conducted
lengthy hearings annually on the status of seafood safety in the United States.185 A general description of
these hearings would include numerous introductory comments by Representatives followed by testimony of
representatives from the Food and Drug Association and National Marine Fisheries Service outlining the
current status of federal programs. State program representatives as well as industry representatives and
members of consumer public interest organizations also made statements at these hearings. As could be
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37expected, the views presented varied little from year to year and the hearings ended with gracious thanks to
the participants but with no action by the committees. In 1992 testimony before the Senate regarding the
Consumer Seafood Safety Act, FDA Commissioner David Kessler placed what was probably the ﬁnal nail
in the coﬃn of universal mandatory inspection. In his testimony, he presented the Bush Administration’s
opposition to the bill and conclusion that existing programs were protecting the consuming public and
the proposed federal law would create “duplicative regulatory systems” that would fracture the existing
amalgam of programs.186 More importantly, Kessler stated the FDA’s preferred course of action, which was
to continue with its existing structure while developing an inspection system based on Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point (HACCP) principles.187 These HACCP principles have since come to dominate the
entire universe of seafood and shellﬁsh regulation.
HACCP in the Seafood and Shellﬁsh Industries
What is HACCP?
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) is not so much a program as it is a way of thinking
about safety. It is not a new concept, though its implementation in the seafood and shellﬁsh industry dates
oﬃcially only to the early 1990’s. HACCP principles were ﬁrst developed by the Pillsbury Company in the
early 1960’s for food intended for the space program as a means of ensuring the safety of food to be eaten
by astronauts when adequate testing was impossible.188 The end goal, safe products available to consumers,
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38is the same under an end-product testing system or a HACCP-based program, but philosophically, the two
approaches are “mirror image(s)” of each other.189
End-product testing and plant inspections, the more traditional approaches to food safety, are reactive rather
than preventive as described by the FDA.190 HACCP principles shift the focus from the end result to the
process used to reach that result in order to ensure a safe result in a more eﬃcient manner. HACCP is a
process of assessing risk attempting to control it and prevent safety issues rather than reacting to unsafe re-
sults. HACCP programs are also unique in that they are designed and implemented by industry participants
and thus require a larger degree of private cooperation than more traditional regulatory approached. This
does not mean, however, that the FDA is absent from the development of HACCP programs. In fact, the
FDA has established a list of seven fundamental principles on which HACCP-based programs are designed:
1.
Analyze hazards- potential hazards and measures to control them are identiﬁed;
2. Identify critical control points- ﬁnd points in the food production process at which hazards can be
controlled or eliminated;
3. Establish preventive measures with critical limits for each control point- create standards by which one
can determine a risk has been eﬀectively controlled or eliminated (such as a minimum cooking temperature
at which microbial contaminants are killed);
4. Establish procedures to monitor the critical control points- create oversight to guarantee hazard control;
5. Establish corrective actions to be taken when monitoring shows that a critical limit has not been met
(such as disposal or reprocessing)
implemented correctly, there would be no testing of the ﬁnished packaged product other than for monitoring purposes.
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396. Establish procedures to verify that the system is working properly- check the established system to be
sure the standards for hazard control (not hazard control itself) are being met;
7. Establish eﬀective record keeping to document the HACCP system- record hazards and control methods
as well as performance of hazard control system.191
The one step not found in the above principles is testing or inspection of the ﬁnal product to guarantee
the standards described in #3 above and the hazard control procedures described in #4 above are actually
ensuring food safety. That is the fundamental diﬀerence of a HACCP-based system. The key assumption
of HACCP is that if the process is working properly, and the process has been designed based on a “sound
scientiﬁc process,”192 then the end product is considered safe for the consumer.193
As mentioned above, HACCP is not a new concept, and though these principles were identiﬁed and estab-
lished approximately thirty years ago, they have been put in practice in diﬀerent forms for a much longer
time. Just in the shellﬁsh safety context, HACCP principles were actually applied to the danger that was
the very source of the creation of the National Shellﬁsh Sanitation Program in 1925. In order to combat the
typhoid outbreak that caused a massive shellﬁsh scare in 1924 and 1925, some HACCP-type principles were
applied to the problem.194 More closely related to the current HACCP principles, however, is the system for
preventing botulism in low-acid canned foods. In fact, the danger of botulism in low-acid foods was the ﬁrst
area of food safety risk to which HACCP principles were directly applied.195 Seafood is, however, the ﬁrst
sector of the food market in which HACCP principles have been applied to the entire sector for all health
and safety risks.196
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40The ﬁrst modern eﬀort to apply HACCP principles to the seafood industry began in the late-1980s. At
the time, as has been discussed above, the safety of the American seafood supply was being seriously called
into question.197 The FDA, acknowledging its eﬀorts had not maintained consumer conﬁdence in seafood
safety, embarked upon a project to update its seafood regulations with HACCP principles.198 Actually, the
very ﬁrst HACCP-based program in the seafood industry was run by the National Marine Fisheries Service.
The Model Seafood Surveillance Project, run as a voluntary, cooperative eﬀort between the states and in-
dustry under the NMFS, started in 1987 and identiﬁed HACCP-based approaches for the majority of the
seafood and shellﬁsh industry.199 After that project was completed, the NMFS began work with the FDA
on developing a comprehensive, voluntary HACCP program that would encompass every aspect of the entire
industry from harvest to consumption.200 This water-to-table HACCP approach was ﬁrst put into eﬀect in
1992 after almost three years in development and became part of the NMFS Voluntary Seafood Inspection
Program.201 Based on the progress of this program and a worldwide movement toward HACCP principles in
food inspection that required American exporters to adopt such programs or suﬀer in international markets,
the FDA began in 1991 studying the feasibility of mandatory HACCP safety controls for the entire seafood
and shellﬁsh industry.202
By 1994, the FDA had progressed to the point of being ready to issue proposed regulations for the entire
seafood and shellﬁsh industry relying on HACCP principles. The proposed rules were issued on January
28, 1994, under the title: Proposal To Establish Procedures for the Safe Processing and Importing of Fish
and Fishery Products.203 The FDA provided in this proposal, and reaﬃrmed in the ﬁnal rule, the reasons
supporting the creation of this new system of seafood regulation. The ﬁve bases for the mandatory HACCP
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41safety controls included:
1)
To create a more eﬀective and eﬃcient system for ensuring the safety of seafood
than currently exists;
2) To enhance consumer conﬁdence;
3) To take advantage of developmental work on the application of HACCP-type preventive controls for
seafood (e.g. the NMFS trials)....
4) To respond to requests by seafood industry representatives that the Federal government institute a
mandatory, HACCP-type inspection system for their products; and
5) To provide U.S. seafood with continued access to world markets, where BHACCP-type controls are
increasingly becoming the norm.204
The FDA also oﬀered the additional explanation that seafood was distinct from almost all other food and
oﬀered unique regulatory challenges given that it is still predominantly wild caught and harvested.205 The
FDA called the traditional inspection system a failure. It cited as a basis for this conclusion both the inability
of inspections to reduce safety hazards in the seafood industry and the diminishing public conﬁdence in the
safety and wholesomeness of the commercial seafood supply.206 HACCP principles were particularly well
suited to the regulation of this industry according to the FDA. “To ensure safety, it is of utmost importance
that those who handle and process seafood commercially understand the hazards associated with (speciﬁc
types of seafood with which they are involved), and keep these hazards from occurring through a routine
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42system of preventive controls.”207
Finally, the FDA addressed issues of international compliance facing American seafood exporters. Though
it acknowledged that international trade was not a public health issue, it addressed concerns in this area as
a major consideration when considering the costs and beneﬁts of a regulatory system.208 HACCP principles
were a desirable basis for regulation in large part because of the adoption of those systems for international
use by the Codex Alimentarious Commission and the growing number of international markets requiring
HACCP-type controls, such as the European Union.209
The speciﬁc regulations put forth in 1994 are neither detailed nor complex. In less than ﬁve pages, they
basically adopt the broad principles of HACCP and apply them to all seafood and shellﬁsh handlers and
processors.210 Industry participants are required to list food safety hazards, list critical control points, list
critical limits on these hazards, list monitoring procedures, include program monitoring procedures and sys-
tem veriﬁcation procedures, and provide for a record keeping system that documents the above.211
The one exception to this abstract level of generality was in the regulation of raw shellﬁsh. The FDA issued
an additional subpart to the regulations speciﬁcally addressing raw shellﬁsh processing.212 In doing so, it
cited as support for this regulatory addition the fact that raw shellﬁsh cause the overwhelming majority
of all seafood-related illnesses.213 The regulations for shellﬁsh processors set forth a series of requirements
applying only to these industry members and in addition to the rest of the HACCP requirements for all
seafood handlers and processors. The regulations, entitled Subpart C, set rules for indicating the eﬀorts
made to control the origin of shellﬁsh processed by these industry participants.214 The regulations stated
that processors were required to: 1) “only process molluscan shellﬁsh harvested from growing waters ap-
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43proved for harvesting by a shellﬁsh control authority”; 2) “accept only shellstock from a harvester that is
in compliance with such licensure requirements as may apply to the harvesting of molluscan shellﬁsh”; 3)
“accept only containers of shucked molluscan shellﬁsh that bear a label (indicating date, location of harvest
and quantity of shellﬁsh).”215
Though the regulations still left the majority of details of shellﬁsh supervision to the states (as with des-
ignation of approved growing waters), this added section marked a huge step in the regulation of shellﬁsh
processing. This was the ﬁrst regulation speciﬁcally tailored to the shellﬁsh industry giving the FDA the
power to regulate and supervise the interstate market. This regulation came with actual enforcement con-
sequences for failure to comply. Most importantly, the regulations stated that, “failure of a processor to
have and implement a HACCP plan that complies with this section...shall render the (seafood) of that
processor adulterated....”216 Whereas prior to this regulation, the FDA had the power only to decertify
state shellﬁsh sanitation programs and no enforcement power against individual industry participants (as
indicated supra with regard to FDA supervision of the NSSP), these provisions gave the FDA the ability to
take action against non-complying processors and handlers as well as their product.217 The FDA provided
as the basis for this unprecedented increase in enforcement authority, with regard to shellﬁsh, one proposed
and ultimately rejected twenty years earlier, the continued failure of state and federal voluntary inspection
programs to ensure the safety of the shellﬁsh supply—speciﬁcally by ensuring harvesting only from safe,
uncontaminated growing waters:
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44FDA recognizes that while States are making signiﬁcant and important eﬀorts to ensure that all
shellﬁsh harvested in their jurisdiction are taken only from open waters and then properly tagged,
some shellﬁsh that do not meet these requirements inevitably escape State control. The new pro-
visions will allow FDA to take action against shellﬁsh that are not harvested from open waters or
that are not properly tagged if it encounters such shellﬁsh in interstate commerce and make the
gravamen of such action the origination from unopen waters or the lack of proper tagging itself,
rather than evidence that the shellﬁsh are injurious to health.218
Though the ﬁnal rule was published in 1995, the actual requirement of a HACCP program by every pro-
cessor did not take eﬀect until 1997.219 During that grace period, processors were expected to develop
HACCP plans that would be in accordance with the broad, general requirements of the new regulations.
The FDA recognized the diﬃculty businesses might have in identifying, evaluating and combating safety
hazards that could occur before, during, and after their handling and processing activities. In order to
provide guidance to ﬁrms in developing and implementing HACCP safety plans, the FDA published the
Fish and Fishery Products Hazards and Controls Guide as a supplement to the regulations.220 This guide
was advisory and nonbonding, however, the FDA made clear that its future enforcement actions would
be “consistent with the policies reﬂected in the guidance.”221 The guide provided a start-to-ﬁnish hazard
analysis along with critical control points at which these hazards could be eliminated or contained, in eﬀect
providing industry participants with a model HACCP outline upon which to tailor their own plans.222
Evaluating the HACCP Program 5 Years In
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45As noted above, the 1995 regulations were the ﬁrst time the FDA had instituted a HACCP-based program
for an entire sector of the food industry. Though the principles underlying HACCP had been in existence
for three decades and had been evaluated and tested in numerous federal studies and academic analyses as
well as through implementation in smaller trial programs, the industry-wide program itself had no proven
track record and was very much an experiment in modern regulation. In fact, the FDA recognized this and
considered the need for evaluation of the program on of the most serious post-implementation challenges for
the HACCP safety control system.
Even prior to ﬁnal implementation of the mandatory requirements, the FDA was already struggling with
ﬁnding means of evaluating the results. As Dr. Michael Friedman, the Deputy Commissioner for Operations
at the FDA testiﬁed to Congress in 1996, “(h)ow to evaluate the eﬀectiveness and worth of the mandatory
HACCP program for seafood raises issues that have not fully been solved.”223 Dr. Friedman conceded that
consumer conﬁdence in seafood safety, for instance, would not likely improve solely because a new regulatory
regime had been put in place. Additionally, he cited as the single “most relevant accomplishment” he hoped
to be achieved by the program would be “a measurable decrease in seafood-borne illnesses.”224 Beyond this
measure, determining the eﬀectiveness of the HACCP system in the short term may primarily mean judging
the level of compliance by industry with the imposed requirements. This indication would demonstrate
whether the regulations themselves were actually being implemented at the level of individual processors.
The eﬀectiveness of the control programs adopted, however, might ultimately only be measurable through
longer-term examinations of seafood health risks and seafood-related illnesses.
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46The GAO set out in 2000 to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of federal seafood regulation. It published its re-
sults in two separate reports distinguishing between all seafood other than shellﬁsh and shellﬁsh (oysters,
clams, mussels, and scallops). Perhaps giving away the results, the two reports, published in January
and July of 2001, were entitled: Federal Oversight of Seafood Does Not Suﬃciently Protect Consumers and
Federal Oversight of Shellﬁsh Safety Needs Improvement.225 Both reports focused on the FDA’s role under
the new HACCP requirements, with the shellﬁsh report also analyzing federal involvement in the ISSC. The
two reports are dealt with separately below.
Report on the Regulation of the (non-Shellﬁsh) Seafood Industry
The GAO identiﬁed a series of problems that have prevented HACCP regulations from achieving the safety
assurance goals intended. Most striking was the fact that, although the regulations took eﬀect in 1997 and
industry had been provided a two-year grace period to prepare for the mandatory system, the percentage of
ﬁrms complying with the requirements of the system by 1999 had still only reached 44%.226 Despite the fact
this statistic indicates noncompliance by a majority of the industry, the FDA had actually made signiﬁcant
progress in this area, raising the ﬁgure from 32% in 1998.227 Aside from initial gaps in implementation that
might be eliminated over time as the system becomes more familiar to the industry, the GAO identiﬁed four
major weaknesses of the current regulatory regime that require correction if program eﬀectiveness is to be
improved.
First, despite the fact that HACCP requirements were intended to be universal, a large portion of the in-
dustry either is not participating or is exempt from the requirements. The FDA does not have a system
of identifying seafood processors and thus cannot determine the level of participation. Though the FDA
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47has identiﬁed almost 4,000 seafood processors, the GAO concluded that the actual number is likely much
higher.228 The level of compliance at these ﬁrms cannot be determined, quite simply, because the FDA is not
aware of their existence. Additionally, the FDA has exempted a large number of seafood processors involved
in interstate commerce. Commercial ﬁshing vessels that engage in some level of processing of their catch are
excluded from the deﬁnition of “processor” under the HACCP requirements.229 The FDA rationale for this
exemption is practical in nature: the commercial ﬁshing ﬂeet is so large that it would overwhelm the system
if these were subject to HACCP requirements and FDA inspection.230 Finally, though almost all products
possess risks for which HACCP procedures could be established, the FDA exempts those products that
pose risks not reasonably likely to occur. This exemption has led to 30% of all seafood products not being
subjected to HACCP plan requirements.231 The GAO contrasted this situation with USDA requirements
for meat and poultry processors where all products must be included in a processor’s HACCP plan.232
Second, the GAO criticized FDA monitoring of HACCP compliance by ﬁrms covered by the system. Al-
most one-half of all inspections performed by the FDA are little more than paperwork reviews whereas full
inspections, according to agency policy, are supposed to focus on in-plant observation of actual product
processing.233 Even for the quantity and quality of inspections that did occur, compliance is remarkably
low. 22% of products for which a HACCP plan is required had none in 1999, and more than half of the
HACCP plans that did exist contained “serious deﬁciencies”.234 The GAO evaluated serious deﬁciencies
based on FDA compliance manual standards based almost entirely on the seven HACCP principles.235 The
six types of serious deﬁciencies are: 1) not identifying serious health and safety hazards; 2) not identifying a
critical control point for each hazard; 3) not identifying a critical limit for the control point; 4) not identify-
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48ing appropriate monitoring procedures; 5) not identifying record keeping procedures; and 6) not identifying
adequate corrective action procedures when monitoring identiﬁed failures of the system.236 The GAO cited
a further weakness in the HACCP requirements in that one speciﬁc health risk is not addressed even in plans
that meet FDA guidelines. The FDA has established no HACCP requirement for methyl mercury despite the
fact the substance is highly toxic and has recently been identiﬁed in dangerous levels in some popular types
of seafood.237 This omission, according to the GAO, leaves even complying HACCP programs incomplete
in addressing health and safety risks for several seafood species.
FDA response to HACCP regulation violations is also not eﬀective. The principal means of addressing vi-
olations identiﬁed in plant inspections is the warning letter; however, the GAO noted that 94% of warning
letters are delayed beyond the recommended issuance timelines with the time between receipt of warning
letter recommendations and approval of the ﬁnal letters averaging 73 days.238 This failure by the FDA to
provide timely notice of regulatory violations is most signiﬁcant because 67% of all warning letters issued
are for what are considered serious health risks, such as Scromboid Poisoning.239 The FDA response is that
warning letters have to pass through a review process that leads 95% of all letters to be rewritten before
ﬁnal approval.240
The third major weakness of the HACCP plan is signiﬁcant because it demonstrates the potential gap be-
tween HACCP compliance and actual risk reduction. According to the GAO, the FDA is proceeding with
HACCP on little more than a presumption that full implementation will actually result in a decrease in
the number of seafood-related illnesses.241 In contrast, the USDA determined salmonella levels in meat and
poultry before implementation of its HACCP requirements in order to be able to measure the eﬀectiveness
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49of the HACCP program in reducing that health risk.242 The FDA responded that the wide variety of health
risks in seafood diﬀers greatly from the relatively small number of signiﬁcant risks in meat and poultry,
making end result measurements less feasible, but the fact that many health risks that account for the over-
whelming majority of seafood illnesses, such as Ciguatoxin and Scromboid Poisoning, are species-speciﬁc
makes this counter less convincing.
Finally, the FDA is not able to adequately ensure the level of HACCP compliance by imported seafood
processors. As noted above, imports account for approximately 60% of the entire seafood market, so imports
are no small concern. Yet, the FDA has very limited capacity to evaluate the safety control measures applied
by processors in other countries or to determine the safety of imported products. The GAO noted two major
obstacles to compliance measurement. First, the FDA has not yet developed equivalence agreements with
any importer country, though these agreements, which establish the equivalence of those countries’ processes
with HACCP requirements, are the simplest and most eﬀective means of ensuring compliance.243 In the ab-
sence of equivalence agreements, the FDA must establish the compliance of each importer ﬁrm, yet the FDA
concedes that less than one-third of all importers can provide documentation or otherwise demonstrate that
its procedures comply with HACCP requirements.244 Finally, the FDA is not able to engage in inspections
at the port of entry such that product safety can be determined. Less than 1% of all imports are subject to
any kind of laboratory inspection and only 3% even receive a visual inspection.245
The GAO outlined the following recommended actions by the FDA in order to improve the eﬀectiveness of
its seafood HACCP program:
1.
242Jan Rep 22
243Jan Rep 23
244Jan Rep 23
245Jan Rep 32
50Require compliance by all processors including ﬁshing vessels-
this includes adoption of a relatively inexpensive system of requiring registration of
all processors engaged in interstate commerce so that HACCP inspections can take place;
2. Conduct in-depth audits of all existing HACCP systems to determine compliance;
3. Emphasize actual product processing observation during inspections;
4. Get serious about the methyl mercury risk by moving beyond consumer advisories and establishing
recommended HACCP control procedures;
5. Issue warning letters to violators on a timely basis;
6. Assess the eﬀectiveness of HACCP systems in reducing health risks and occurrence of seafood-related
illnesses;
7. Develop equivalence agreements and possibly require them for all importing countries (this would ne-
cessitate Congress amending the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act);
8. Develop eﬀective port of entry inspections to prevent dangerous products from reaching American
markets.246
In sum, the FDA did not disagree with most of these recommendations except in that it did not think
requiring ﬁshing vessels to comply with HACCP requirements would be either feasible or desirable.247 The
FDA also cited a need for signiﬁcantly increased funding to resolve most of the problems illustrated in this
report.248
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51Report on the Regulation of the Shellﬁsh Industry
The GAO evaluation of the FDA’s shellﬁsh supervision included evaluation of cooperative eﬀorts with the
ISSC and administration of the NSSP. Particular attention was directed towards Vibrio Vulniﬁcus risks
as that continues to be the deadliest shellﬁsh-related health risk. Most shellﬁsh regulation is still at the
state level and is essentially voluntary under the ISSC and NSSP, however 1997 did change circumstances
somewhat with the application of HACCP requirements to all shellﬁsh processors.249 Additionally, the NSSP
has incorporated HACCP principles into its requirements for all participating states.250
Signiﬁcantly, Vulniﬁcus is not treated as a hazard to be identiﬁed or controlled for under HACCP plans.251
The FDA and ISSC provide several reasons for the exclusion of Vulniﬁcus from its HACCP requirements,
though upon examination, those justiﬁcations may not stand up to direct scrutiny. The ﬁrst reason Vulniﬁcus
is not classiﬁed as a health hazard is that it occurs naturally in shellﬁsh.252 That reasoning does not seem
to make sense given health hazard designation of other natural seafood safety risks such as scrombotoxin
and ciguatoxin. The FDA and ISSC provide not basis for this distinction, though it is possible that the
universality of contamination, particularly of Gulf Oysters, may inﬂuence this decision. Further, regulators
cite uncertainty about the level of contamination necessary to cause illness.253 Again, this justiﬁcation does
not seem to provide a distinction from other hazards covered under HACCP, such as many chemical con-
taminants, for which the precise level of exposure that poses a health threat is unknown. Still, Vulniﬁcus is
exempt from HACCP requirements and is thus treated separately in this report.
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52The GAO identiﬁed three primary failures of FDA oversight of the NSSP. These track somewhat similarly to
the failures of non-shellﬁsh regulation. The distinction lies in the fact that the FDA’s role in shellﬁsh safety
is much more one of supervision and coordination rather than direct inspection, which is primarily left to
the states under the NSSP.
First, the FDA does engage in risk-assessment to determine resource allocation.254 Though the FDA concedes
it has limited resources available to engage in program monitoring and review, it has no way of allocating its
resources in a manner that can eﬃciently address the most serious health and safety risks. Instead, the FDA
basically expends equal resources monitoring each NSSP-participating state. As an example of the weakness
of this approach, the GAO pointed out that the FDA spent basically the same amount of money evaluating
the Delaware shellﬁsh program as it did the Louisiana shellﬁsh program despite the fact Delaware produces
far less shellﬁsh for interstate commerce than Louisiana and Louisiana has been the source of a much higher
number of shellﬁsh-related illnesses.255 Additionally, the FDA does not base future resource allocation on
demonstrated risks and past program deﬁciencies. Despite the fact four state programs were seriously in
violation of NSSP requirements in 1999, the FDA allocation of resources for these states did not diﬀer from
that of other states that had been in substantial compliance with program requirements.256
The GAO also reported that the FDA is also failing in its information-gathering responsibilities. The FDA
does not compile state compliance statistics though it acknowledges that many states are neither identifying
contaminated growing waters nor preventing illegal harvesting (two problems cited repeatedly throughout
the 1970’s and 1980’s).257
As with non-shellﬁsh HACCP regulations, the FDA does not have measurable standards of safety risks by
which it can determine the eﬀectiveness of HACCP controls in reducing shellﬁsh-related illnesses.258 Be-
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53cause of this, the FDA cannot evaluate progress or lack thereof nor can it compare state programs to identify
successful approaches to shellﬁsh safety. The FDA responds that it has not been able to identify reliable and
eﬀective means of measuring bacterial reductions and shellﬁsh-related illnesses, and that, until those two
measures are possible, the safety beneﬁts of HACCP controls and other programs cannot be determined.259
With regard to Vibrio Vulniﬁcus, since HACCP programs are not required to address this risk, the GAO
evaluated ISSC eﬀorts to combat illness caused by the bacteria. The GAO concluded that the ISSC has been
unable to reduce risks associated with Vulniﬁcus.260 This determination is based on the fact that, despite
six years of eﬀorts directed speciﬁcally against this single risk, the number of related illnesses and deaths
has remained constant.261
The ISSC has established a goal of reducing illnesses and deaths caused by Vulniﬁcus by 60% by 2008,
but the GAO concluded it is unlikely that the ISSC will meet this level of reduction.262 In the event the
ISSC has not met the goal, states will be required to take further steps to address the problem, and these
could have a signiﬁcant economic impact on the shellﬁsh industry. To date, the ISSC has focused almost
exclusively on consumer education as a means of reducing Vulniﬁcus-related illnesses.263 The NSSP has also
adopted refrigeration requirements, and the GAO concludes that these could have been eﬀective; however,
the requirements were relaxed due to industry concerns about the economic burden they would have placed
on harvesters.264 The result has been no impact on the safety risks posed by Vulniﬁcus-related illnesses.
The GAO presented two general options available to reduce Vulniﬁcus-related illnesses and meet the 60%
reduction goals. The ﬁrst of these options is that of immediate refrigeration requirements.265 This option,
however, is unlikely to be adopted because of the substantial economic costs to harvesters, who are typically
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54smaller operators unable to comply with such requirements. The second option is to require post-harvest
treatment. There are three types of post-harvest treatment available: hydrostatic pressure; “cool pasteur-
ization”; and quick freezing.266 In contrast to refrigeration, these approaches are considered cost eﬀective
for processors. In fact, studies have indicated that both hydrostatic pressure and cool pasteurization could
actually increase revenues for processors by reducing the cost of producing shucked oysters and increasing
the price consumers are willing to pay for treated, half shell oysters.267 The one disadvantage noted for
post-harvest treatments is that some consumers, for taste and aesthetic reasons, would prefer untreated
oysters yet that option could be driven from the market by such requirements.268
Ultimately, the GAO made a series of recommendations for improving shellﬁsh regulation and state super-
vision. Based on these recommendations:
1.
FDA should adopt a risk-based approach to resource allocation;
2. FDA should create a standardized, automated system of compiling state program data and comparing
state programs;
3. FDA should perform baseline testing to establish the eﬀectiveness of HACCP controls and NSSP re-
quirements in reducing safety risks and shellﬁsh-related illnesses;
4. ISSC should develop a post-harvest treatment system to reduce the Vulniﬁcus-related illness risk.269
The FDA essentially agreed with the recommendations of the GAO, but the ISSC disputed two assertions
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55in the report. It rejected generally accepted estimates that shellﬁsh cause approximately 85-90% of all
seafood-related illnesses (100,000 per year), and it maintained the anticipated eﬀectiveness of its programs
in combating Vulniﬁcus-related illnesses, rejecting any need for additional measures at this time.270
National Marine Fisheries Service
The FDA regulatory regime is the dominant yet not the only major federal oversight program for the seafood
industry. The National Marine Fisheries Service maintains its own program for seafood inspection. This
program is neither mandatory nor comprehensive and its focus is on plant inspection rather than seafood
health risks. Still, the program is an important aspect of the current status of seafood regulation.
The Voluntary Seafood Inspection Program (VSIP) was established in 1946 as part of the Agricultural
Marketing Act.271 The program is primarily a fee-for-service plant inspection service with the goal that
“(seafood) products may be marketed to the best advantage, that trading may be facilitated, and that
consumers may be able to obtain the quality product which they desire.”272 As mentioned above, HACCP-
based inspections were incorporated into the program in 1992 before the FDA issued its mandatory HACCP
requirements. The VSIP continues to oﬀer HACCP-based plant inspection as part of its services.
Along with its plant inspection program, the NMFS oﬀers the only seafood grading marks of any federal
program. Participants in the VSIP can obtain a U.S. Grade A, B or C mark on their product as well as
the P.U.F.I. stamp which certiﬁes that the product was “Produced Under Federal Inspection.”273 Despite
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56the apparent marketing advantage one would assume federally graded and certiﬁed seafood products would
have, especially given continuing consumer concerns about seafood safety, the VSIP has never really covered
a large percentage of the overall seafood market. As of 1996, the program only reached about 8% of the entire
seafood industry.274 Often cited as a primary obstacle to more widespread coverage is the fee-for-service
nature of the program. The current price schedule for the program charges approximately $55 per hour for
inspection services.275 In 1998, it was proposed that the program be moved from the NMFS to the FDA, and
the same proposal has been made in each of the following years; however, for now, the program continues to
reside in the National Marine Fisheries Service.
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